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Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two Different
Paradigms of the Right to Be Forgotten
Lawrence Siry'
ABSTRACT
In May of 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union handed
down its decision in the case of Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espailola de
Protecci6n de Datos' This landmark decision ignited a firestorm of debate
over the "right to be forgotten": the right of users to withdraw information
about themselves available on the internet. With concerns about the
restriction of the freedom of expression on the internet, many commentators
have criticized the decision as unworkable and dangerous. Others have
recognized continuity in the development of privacy and data protection
jurisprudence within the European courts. Meanwhile in Brussels, the
European Union (EU) has been crafting a new data protection regulation,
which will apply to its twenty-eight Member States. This new regulation
will more than likely extend the concept of some form of the "right to be
forgotten," or more precisely, a right to erasure ofmaterial on the internet.
This paper will explore the basis and impact of the Google Spain
decision. Beginning with an exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of
the "right to be forgotten" in Europe, the paper will attempt to reconcile the
conceptualization of this privacy right with the privacy framework existing
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in the United States. It will then turn to proposals for legislation from both
sides of the pond to assess what they will and will not potentially achieve.
The paper will consider the European Union rules in light of the current
framework and the proposed reforms, comparing European and American
provisions, specifically California Law and proposals pending before the
United States Congress. Are these measures the silver bullet that privacy
advocates hope for, or will they open a Pandora's box of excessive Internet
censorship that will cause the destruction of history? Are the two theoretical
frameworks compatible, signalling a convergence ofpolicies towards a more
privacy oriented legal structure? To this end, the practical application of the
proposed rules, their effectiveness, and their efficacy will be examined.
INTRODUCTION
Comparatively, it is evident that the concept of privacy in the United States
differs greatly from that in Europe. The expectations of the citizenries differ as
well. Even as Europe and North America become increasingly interconnected
through technology, the instantaneous dissemination of news, information, culture,
and ideas, the neighbors across the pond differ substantially in their opinions on
what information ought to be considered private, how personal information ought
to be protected, what power individuals have in controlling information about them
on the internet, and what role government ought to play in the process.
With the dominance of American companies in the information technology
(IT) sector, it is impossible to effectively consider data protection regulation
without considering the American cultural perspective.' Yet European political and
judicial decisions have created a sense of a right that does not always match these
American perspectives.' Reaching a common understanding is necessary as users
and policymakers seek to maximize the efficiency and continuity of the global
market.s One area that has proven to be both popular and controversial in the
European setting is the fabled "right to be forgotten." Almost utopian in scope, it
would allow cybercitizens to start fresh after a brush with the law, or to forget those
embarrassing, somewhat impetuous photos that one posed for back in one's
The Software and Information Technology Services Industry in the United States, SELECT USA,
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/software-and-information-technology-services-
industry-united-states (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
Alistair Barr & Sam Schechner, Google Advisory Group Recommends Limiting 'Right to Be
Forgotten' to EU, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2015 3:35AM), http://www.wsj.com/artides/google-advisory
-group-says-limit-right-to-be-forgotten-to-eu-1423206470.
s Currently, negotiations are ongoing between the United States and the European Union
surrounding the domain of data protection. See Press Release, European Comm'n, EU-US Data
Protection Agreement Negotiations: Frequently Asked Questions (May 26, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-10-216_en.htm?locale=en; EUROPEAN COMM'N,
FACTSHEET EU-US NEGOTIATIONS ON DATA PROTECTION, (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justicial
data-protection/files/factsheets/umbrella factsheet_en.pdf.
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carefree youth.' Moreover, it would even allow for past failed business schemes to
rest quietly, where they might belong, in the past.' In many ways, this "right to be
forgotten" is a right derived from the pre-digital era. Newspapers tended to rot and
photographs faded or got lost with the passage of time. Business acumen was
judged on a current scale rather than one that relied too heavily on ancient
memory. Time truly did heal most wounds.
In many respects, the American dream is grounded in a "right to be forgotten":
the idea that an individual of whatever stripe could land on the American shore to
begin anew. Reinvention was a key attribute of the new world. Yet, with the
invention and pervasiveness of the internet, things have truly changed. The internet
never forgets, or at least, that is our assumption and our fear.
On the European stage, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
entered the fray on the 13th of May, 2014 with its long awaited ruling in Google
Spain,' which changes the terrain of online privacy and the ability of citizens to be
forgotten. The ruling has the potential to vastly alter the discussions both with
regard to legislation being considered by the European Union, as well as the
business model employed by Internet related firms such as Google and Facebook.'
In the sections that follow, this paper will examine the conceptualization of the
right to privacy, which is the underpinning of the "right to be forgotten" in Europe
and the U.S. Focusing on legislation and proposed legislation in these two
jurisdictions, the paper will attempt to find the common ground between the two
regimes. The paper will also examine the potential impact of Google Spain. Lastly,
the paper will attempt to determine if the "right to be forgotten" is truly necessary
or whether it's a gimmick that will have little impact on the core rights of privacy
and expression.
6 See Tessa Mayes, We Have No Right to be Forgotten Online, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2011,
10:16 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/mar/18/forgotten-online-
european-union-law-internet ("[A] right to be forgotten is about extreme withdrawal, and in its worse
guise can be an antisocial, nihilist act. If enacted, a right to be forgotten would signify the emasculation
of [the European Union's] power to act in the world."); see also Danny Hakim, Right to be Forgotten?
Not that Easy, INT'L N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/business/inter
national/on-the-internet-the-right-to-forget-vs-the-right-to-know.html.
' See Hakim, supra note 6 ("[T]he tech industry has portrayed the decision as a blow against the
free flow of information on the web and a victory for those who want to cover up past misdeeds
-including pedophiles, corrupt politicians and unscrupulous businesspeople.").
'Google Spain, Case C-131/12.
' See generally Essential Guide: EU Data Protection Regulation, COMPUTER WKLY.,
http://www.computerweekly.com/guides/Essential-guide-What-the-EU-Data-Protection-Regulation-
changes-mean-to-you (last visited Feb. 8, 2015); European Comm'n, Protection of Personal Data,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection (last updated Sept. 4, 2014).
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I. THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
A. The Basis for the Right: European Privacy and Data Protection
In order to fully appreciate the development of the "right to be forgotten" in
Europe, it is necessary to take a step back and briefly look at the development of
fundamental rights in a pan-European context, particularly the right to privacy, or
private life, since the "right to be forgotten" derives from privacy rights and data
protection legislation.
Fundamental rights in Europe are protected not only by national constitutional
paradigms, but also by pan-European structures. After the Second World War,
western democracies founded the Council of Europe and signed the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).o Rooted in the determination to never
repeat the rights abuses of the past, contracting states established minimum
principles that all citizens could rely upon." The Convention included inter aha,
the rights to life, fair process, privacy, and the freedom of expression.1 2 Perceived
violations of these rights can be brought before the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR)." Additionally, contracting states have an obligation to protect
their citizens from intrusions against these rights by third parties.14 With the
democratization of Europe, particularly following the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989 and the end of the Cold War, the Council of Europe has expanded to include
forty-seven European nations.s
Contrastingly, the European Union began in 1950 as an economic agreement
between the nations that comprised the European Coal and Steel Community:
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. 16 The
purpose of this union was to avoid another European war by bringing the means of
production of the instruments of war under shared management.'" Alongside
treaties designed to bring atomic energy into a common management scheme, as
well as the beginning of a common market for the Member States, what would
become the European Union began as an economic, rather than political union."
n Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG
.pdf.
" See Aisha Gani, What is the European Convention on human rights?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3,
20140, 10:48 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/03/what-is-european-convention-on
-human-rights-echr; see generally ECHR, supra note 10.
12 Id. arts. 2, 6, 8, 10, at 224, 228, 230.
13 ECHR, supra note 10, art. 5, 19.
14 See generally Id.
s Matthias Bieri, The Council of Europe: Time for Reform, STRATFOR (May 28, 2013, 7:43
AM), https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/council-europe-time-reform.
16 The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu
-history/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
17 Id.
1s How the EU Works, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/indexen.htm (last visited Feb.
16, 2015).
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With the passage of time, ties (both economic and political) have grown and,
through a series of treaties, so has membership in the Union. Today there are
twenty-eight Member States of the European Union, all of which are contracting
states to the European Convention on Human Rights."
In 2009, the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon effectuated constitutional (or
primary) law within the European Union.20 Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter), a primary source of
human rights in the European Union, became legally binding.21 The Charter was
proclaimed in 2000 when the Treaty of Nice was adopted, yet its legal value was
originally unclear. While many of the rights contained in the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Charter are similar, the Charter is more
specific in terms of both privacy and data protection rights.22
The CJEU, located in Luxembourg, is the arbiter of the interpretation of
treaties of the European Union. In areas where the Luxembourg Court interprets
rights under the Charter, it follows the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights.23
In the European Union, the right to data protection stems from the right to
privacy as set out in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,24 as
well as Article 7 (the right to private life) and Article 8 (the right to the protection
of personal data) of the European Union Charter. 2s Primarily, these rights
emanated from the right to maintain a private life that the State could not unduly
interfere with.
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the CJEU has only
recently been authorized to apply the Charter in a meaningful fashion. The
" See How the EU Works: EU Member Countries, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about
-eu/countries/member-countries (last visited Feb 16, 2015); see also Development of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, MIGRATION CITIZENSHIP
EDUCATION, http://migrationeducation.de/28.2.html?&rid=32&cHash=el46ce9478dac99328adbd
62782641 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
20 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
21 EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental
-rights/charter/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
' Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter EU
Charter].
23 Ditlev Tamm, The History of the Court ofJustice of the European Union Since its Origin, in
THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVE ON
SIXTY YEARS OF CASE LAW 9, 14 (Asser Press, 2013).
24 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 8, at 230.
25 EU Charter, supra note 21, arts. 7-8, at 393.
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ECtHR, however, has developed robust jurisprudence protecting privacy. 26 Under
rulings handed down by the ECtHR, the right to privacy is vast and affords a broad
spectrum of protections, including: relationships within families, the rights of
persons to choose sexual partners, the rights of persons to be free from certain types
of surveillance, the rights of persons (including celebrities) to be free from intrusion
into their private sphere, as well as the right of convicted persons to re-integrate
into society after serving a criminal penalty.27 In 1992, the ECtHR attempted to
define the right to privacy, stating:
"[I]t would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in which the
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom
entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private
life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings."28
The right to privacy is also a right that must be balanced against other rights
such as the freedom of expression. The Court's test for determining whether there
has been a violation of the right to privacy begins with an inquiry into whether the
right has been interfered with.29 Next the Court determines whether there was a
basis in law for the action that was taken."o The Court then looks to see whether
the interference promoted a legitimate governmental aim and whether it was
necessary in a democratic society." The Court does give governments a margin of
appreciation in their actions, which is designed to take into account the complexity
of historical and cultural differences that exist amongst the contracting states.32 The
right to private life is a positive right, requiring governments of contracting states
to protect citizens from intrusion on the right by outside actors.3
26 See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000) (holding that the
discharge of personnel from the Royal Navy on the basis of their homosexuality was a breach of their
right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR).
27 See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000) (holding that the
discharge of personnel from the Royal Navy on the basis of their homosexuality was a breach of their
right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR).
Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23, para. 29 (1992).
29 See, e.g., Smith & Grady, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at paras. 70-80; see also A, B & C v. Ireland, 2032
Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 216-241 (2010), available athttp://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/2032.
html.
3o A, B & C, 2032 Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 216-241.
31 Id.
32 Monica Lugato, The "Margin of Appreciation" and Freedom of Religion: Between Treaty
Interpretation and Subsidiarity 52 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUD. 49, 51-52 (2013) (noting that
recognition of the "margin of appreciation" has developed because "historical and cultural variations
[among Member States] must be taken into account.")
33 See, e.g., Jean-Francois Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations Under the European Convention
on Human Rights: A Guide to the Implementation of the European Obligations Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/D
G2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-07 (2007).pdf (discussing the "positive obligation" of the right
to a private life that is free from interference from outside actors).
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Over time, the right to privacy evolved to include personal data. In cases such as
Leander v. Sweden34 and S & Marper v. United Kingdom, 3s the ECtHR
determined that this right to privacy includes the protection of information relating
to a person-a right to protection of personal data-specifically from the
supervision and surveillance of States.
While the ECHR dealt primarily with the protection of privacy, which then
evolved to include protection of personal data, during the 1980s, the members of
the Council of Europe specifically designed legislation to deal with the rise of
information technology and processing abilities and the impact it had in terms of
protecting citizens' personal data. With the growth and expansion of information
technology in the 1960s and 1970s, 6 it became evident that binding rules were
required to ensure effective protection. Accordingly, the Council of Europe enacted
the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108)," the first pan-European data
protection legislation. Convention 108 sought to "secure. .. for every individual . .
. respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to
privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data."3
Against this backdrop, the European Union crafted Directive 95/46/EC ("the
Data Protection Directive" or "DPD") concerning the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such
data. " While the European Union sought to find a measure addressing the
mounting processing powers and their increasingly global scale,40 the major thrust
behind the Data Protection Directive was the harmonization of the internal
market.41
Enacted under Article 100 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community of the European Union (EC Treaty),42 which was concerned with the
introduction of measures for the proper functioning of the internal market, the
14 Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, para. 48 (1987).
" S & Marper v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2008).
36 See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN
DATA PROTECTION LAW 15-16 (2014) [hereinafter HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook-data-protection ENG.pdf.
" Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data art. 1, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention 108], available athttp://conventions
.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.
s Id. While the majority of signatories are Council of Europe members (forty-five out of forty-six
signatories), it is equally open to other nations, with Uruguay becoming the first non-European
signatory in 2013. HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 17.
" Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 [hereinafter Directive 95/46].
' Andrew Charlesworth, Clash of the Data Titans? US and EU Data Privacy Regulation, 6 EUR.
PUB. L. 253, 254 (2000).
1 HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 18; DOUWE KORFF, DATA PROTECTION LAWS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 8 (Richard Hagle ed., 2005).
42 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 100, Aug. 31, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 6, 34.
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DPD became intrinsically linked to the efficiency of the internal market.43 With
the exploitation of personal data becoming an important feature of the Internet
economy, cross-border data flows became more prevalent. The general consensus
was that uniformity was necessary to ensure the growth and evolution of the
internal market to enable online economic activity. 44 Additionally, for Internet
services to become fully economically viable within the European Union, data
subjects needed to feel protected. Therefore, guarding their privacy became an
imperative for the success of the internal Internet market. 45
The adoption of the DPD, however, faced a rocky road, as it would harmonize
an area so thoroughly embedded in Member States' national law and, in many
instances, in their own Constitutions. 46 At the time of its inception, several
Member States had already introduced mechanisms for data protection. 47 These
safeguards were hardly uniform, however, and ranged in scope and application.
The understanding of data protection as a fundamental right rather than a right
linked inextricably to the internal market was enhanced through the adoption of
the Treaty of Lisbon . 48 Data protection was offered a greater foundation in
European Union law through the incorporation of the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights in primary European Union law49 and by the introduction of
Article 16 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).50
The fundamental status of data protection following these changes elevated the
importance of a robust and coherent data protection regime throughout the
European Union. The Directive brought together the Member States' varying
levels of protection to create legal uniformity in the European Union in terms of
data protection laws, which served to further the objectives of the internal market.s'
However, the Data Protection Directive has its limitations. It applies
exclusively to natural persons-not to legal persons-where their activities are
carried out in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 52 Furthermore,
it does not apply to areas of criminal law, as defined by each Member State, nor
41 Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime, 24
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 508, 512 (2008).
4 SERGE GUTWIRTH, PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION AGE 91-92 (Raf Casert trans., 2002).
45 Id.
' See Chris Jones, National Legal Challenges to the Data Retention Directive, EU LAW
ANALYSIS (Apr. 8, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/04/national-legal-challenges-to
-data.html.
17 Id. at 87.
sTreaty of Lisbon, supra note 20, at 32, 51.e EU Charter, supra note 21, art. 8(1), at 393 ("Everyone has the right to the protection of personal
data concerning him or her.").
so Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 16(1), May
9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 55 [hereinafter TFEU] ("Everyone has the right to the protection of
personal data concerning them.").
s1 See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-US. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures,
126 HARv. L. REV. 1966, 1988 (2013) (noting that "the EU has long been interested in the free flow of
personal information and trade in [data] as part of the development of a vibrant internal market").
s2 See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31.
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does it apply to matters of State security.s" In fact, the entirety of Titles V and VI
of the TEU-which cover the areas of freedom, security, justice, and police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters-are outside the scope of the Directive,
meaning that both State security matters and criminal law matters on the European
Union and national level are excluded.54 In addition, the European Court of Justice
has held that the right to data protection is not an exclusive right, but rather a
limited right that must be balanced against other fundamental rights.5
In terms of the "right to be forgotten," the European Union data protection
framework offers several possible avenues to assert the right to have certain
personal data excluded. One such avenue is Article 6 of the Data Protection
Directive 95/46, which states that data must be accurate and up to date or
otherwise be erased or rectifieds 6 and should only be kept identifiable for as long as
it is necessary for the purposes for which it was collected or further processed.s"
Arguments have been made that this latter provision is somewhat "useless in
practice," because in the constantly evolving world of online marketing, "personal
data is permanently collected and used for never-ending purposes."ss The Article
29 Working Party (an independent, advisory committee to the EU's European
Commission made up of representatives from each EU member State Data
Protection Agency, as well as representatives of EU institutions and the EU
Commission) has attempted to rectify this through its Opinion on Purpose
Limitation, in which it stresses the need for compatible further use of data with the
primary purpose.s" The Opinion relies on examples such as "online marketing," and
states that any description of the purposes for data collection cannot be defined too
broadly, but must correctly inform the data subjects of the intentions behind said
purposes."o Nevertheless, the Opinion also acknowledges that with layered privacy
notices, data controllers may further process data."
Furthermore, if data processing is based on consent, any further processing-
unless based on another reason-would not comply with the DPD after a subject
ss Id. art. 4, at 39.
s4 Id.
s See Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 & C-139/01, Rechnungshof, Neukomm, Lauermann v.
Osterreichischer Rundfunk, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5014, 1-5042.
56 Council Directive 95/46, art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40.
s Id.; see also Jef Ausloos, The 'Right To Be Forgotten' - Worth Remembering?, 28 COMPUTER
L. & SECURITY REV. 143, 149-150 (2012); Richard Jones & Dalal Tahri, An Overview ofEU Data
Protection Rules on Use of Data Collected Online, 27 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 630, 633
(2011).
s Ausloos, supra note 57, at 150.
' See generally Opinion 03/2013 of the Data Protection Working Party on Purpose Limitation, at
23-27 (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article
-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf (discussing the different factors
that should be considered when determining whether further processing is compatible and allowed
under the Directive).
I See id. at 15-16.
61 See id. at 16.
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withdraws consent."2 While it might be argued that the withdrawal of consent does
not apply to any past processing activities and is only applicable to future processing
activities, withdrawing consent for a specific set of data-even past data-should
entail an end to processing. For example, deleting a picture on a social networking
account might be considered withdrawing consent for further processing, as the
social network user no longer wishes for the picture to be available. If the picture is
deleted-i.e. consent is withdrawn-it is no longer possible for the data controller
to process the data and it should be removed, since even storing the data qualifies
as processing it." Additionally, the Article 29 Working Party has posited that a
data subject should always be allowed to withdraw his/her consent.64 However,
there is no specific provision for this in the DPD nor an overt requirement to
delete data after the data subject has chosen to withdraw consent, making the
reliance on this particular right somewhat troublesome.65
There is a requirement to delete data in Article 12(b) of the DPD, which
provides for "the [right to] rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing
of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular
because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data."66 The application of
these provisions, however, is not entirely clear due to the specification that the data
be incomplete or inaccurate.6 7 Also, because the DPD provides that "rectification,
erasure or blocking"68 should be employed "as appropriate," erasure may not always
be the chosen route to handle the "incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data."
Where consent has been withdrawn or the data is no longer needed for the
purposes for which it was collected, erasure of the data could follow, as processing
would no longer comply with the requirements of the DPD.7 o If the data subject
wishes to exercise this right, it would be up to the controller to prove that the
processing is legitimate.7 1
62 Opinion 15/2011 of the Data Protection Working Party on the Definition of Consent, at 9 (July
13, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2011/wpl87_en.pdf.
63 See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 ("'[Plrocessing of personal data' . . .
shall mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction . . . . ").
' Opinion 15/2011, supra note 62, at 9; see Paul Bernal, The EU, the US and the Right To Be
Forgotten, in RELOADING DATA PROTECTION: MULTIDISCIPLINARY INSIGHTS AND
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 61, 62 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the individual's
right to withdraw consent is protected under the existing data protection regime).
6s Meg Leta Ambrose &Jef Ausloos, The Right to be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. INFO. POL'Y
1, 7 (2013); see HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 60.
* Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42.
61 See id.
61 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id.
70 HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 111.
71 Id.
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Article 14(a) of the DPD also offers data subjects the possibility to object to
processing, subject to a very specific and narrow set of requirements.72 Member
States must grant a right to object where processing is based on Article 7(e)-
"processing ... for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest"-or
Article 7(f)-"processing . . . for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by
the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed."7 1
Furthermore, the data subjects may only object on a "compelling legitimate
ground" relating to their "particular situation" to the processing of data relating to
them.74 So, in cases where the data subjects have consented, where the processing is
necessary to perform a contract, where the procession meets a legal obligation, or
where the procession protects a vital interest of the data subject, the Member State
need not offer a right to object. One clear option to prevent processing is through
Article 14(b) by which data subjects are always empowered to object to processing
without needing justification as long as the data will be used for direct marketing
purposes, or following notification of data disclosure to third parties.7 1
In theory, therefore, the DPD provides for several avenues for data erasure.
However, as noted, the application of these options is somewhat flawed. Attempts
to have online personal data deleted can be found in various Member States, with
the most notorious example probably being the German Sedlmayr case.n
In 1990, Wolfgrang Werl6 and Manfred Lauber were convicted of the murder
of Walter Sedlmayr, a famous actor." Due to the high-profile status of the victim,
news reports and articles about the two killers flourished, resulting in a number of
articles about the two available online.7 9 After they had served lengthy sentences for
Sedlmayr's murder, Werl6 and Lauber sued publishers for the removal of
information from various websites about their involvement as they felt it would
negatively impact their lives after imprisonment.so They sought to delete the data
about them online by relying on their personality rights.' German law states that
"true statements may violate personality rights, when they are likely to have a
negative effect on the person or his reputation, which is disproportionate to the
interest of disseminating the truth," particularly where statements have a potentially
large audience and can lead to the social exclusion of the person.82 While the two
men were successful in the lower courts, the German Federal Court held that "as
72 Council Directive 95/46, art. 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42.
* Id. arts. 7, 14, at 40, 42-43.
74 Id. art. 14, at 42-43.
s Ambrose & Ausloos, supra note 65.
76 Council Directive 95/46, art. 14(b) 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 43.
n See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 21, 1994, 40 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 211,1994 (Ger.).
" Lawrence Siry & Sandra Schmitz, A Right To Be Forgotten? - How Recent Developments in
Germany MayAfect the Internet Publishers in the US, 3 EUR. J. L. &TECH., no. 1, 2012, at 1, 3.
79 Id.
o Id. at 3-4.
"1John Schwartz, Two German Killers Demanding Anonymity Sue Wikipedia's Parent, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/us/13wiki.html.
8 Id. at 4.
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long as the archived story does not give the impression that it is up to date or
presents an afresh publication on the offender or has the characteristics of an afresh
publication, the provision of the story in an online archive is legal."" With regard
to the relatively easy access to the stories by search engines, the Court determined
that the fact that the service facilitated finding older stories did "not constitute
sufficient reason to eliminate our 'historical memory."' 8 4 The personality rights in
Germany were, thus, not sufficient to eliminate the value of data retained online
about the pair and their crime."s
On the heels of the Sedlmayr case, the Italian courts faced similar issues. In
2010, an Italian court found Google executives guilty of violating Italian privacy
law because they failed to remove from the Google Italia Video service a video of a
disabled boy being bullied."6 The executives have since been acquitted by the Italian
Supreme Court which found that, as a hosting provider under the e-Commerce
Directive," Google could not be considered liable absent knowledge or notice."
B. Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos
In 2012, the Spanish data protection authority brought before the Court of
Justice of the European Union a case that is currently garnering substantial
attention." The case centered on the extent to which the Data Protection Directive
applies to Internet search engines and the extent of the application of the "right to
be forgotten."90
* Id. at 5.
4 Id.
s The UK witnessed a similar, though more nefarious, incident regarding two ten-year-olds
abducting, torturing, and killing a two-year-old. Both were put in juvenile detention, but rather than
relying on data protection to prevent information about them spreading, the chosen course of action
instead was to issue an injunction after the trial against any publication of information relating to the
identity and location of the boys. The injunction was maintained after their release to protect their new
identities. Speculation as to their whereabouts and identities persist and a number of cases regarding the
breach of the injunction have been heard with resulting suspended sentences. Yet, dedicated Wikipedia
cases and news articles persist. See, e.g., Murder of James Bulger, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Murder.-ofjamesBulger&oldid=632422899 (last modified
Nov. 4, 2014). As will be seen in the sections that follow, a real question would be whether the German
courts (or for that matter, any national court in the EU) would decide the case similarly after the Google
Spain case.
86 See Jon Brodkin, Italy Finally Acquits Google Execs Convicted over User-Uploaded Video,
ARsTECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/italy-finally-
acquits-google-execs-convicted-over-user-uploaded-video.
8 Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal
Market art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13.
88 See, e.g., Giulio Coraggio, Google Vividown Case Sets New Rules on Internet Liability, DLA
PIPER IPT ITALY BLOG (Feb. 17, 2014), http://blogs.dlapiper.com/iptitaly/google-vividown-case-sets-
new-rules-on-internet-liability.
" Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL Google, Inc. v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos
(AEPD) (E.C.J. May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document-print.jsPdoclang-EN
&docid=152065.
* Id. paras. 1-2.
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In the Google Spain case, Costeja Gonzilez, a Spanish citizen wished to
remove information related to an auction of his real estate due to social security
debts from an online newspaper archive." The publisher of the newspaper, La
Vanguardia, refused the request, stating that the publication of the information was
not only legal, but mandated by a state institution.92 In response, Costeja Gonzilez
contacted Google to have the links to the information removed. 3
In 2010, Costeja GonzAlez filed a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection
Agency, Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), against both the
newspaper and Google Spain, claiming that the retention of the material on the
internet amounted to a violation of his rights under the Spanish transposition of
the Data Protection Directive.94
The AEPD dismissed the complaint against La Vanguardia, holding that "the
information in question was legally justified as it took place upon order of the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity
to the auction in order to secure as many bidders as possible."95 To the contrary, the
AEPD found that operators of search engines, such as Google Spain, are subject to
data protection legislation since they act as intermediaries and are responsible for
the data they process.9 6 As such, the AEPD found that it had the authority to
require Google to remove access to certain information that would violate national
data protection laws and the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the European Union
Charter, protected therein. 7
Google Spain brought an action in Spanish courts to annul the decision of the
AEPD. The Spanish court in turn referred the question of interpretation of
European law to the Court ofJustice of the European Union.9 8
A fundamental issue that the Court addressed was whether search engines
could be considered "controllers" of data." If yes, they would be subject to the
DPD as transposed by national law. 00 Contrastingly, if search engines were found
to be mere intermediaries of data dissemination, then they would not be subject to
the regulations of the DPD. "' Relying on previous jurisprudence, the Court
91 Id. para. 14.
92 Id. para. 16.
9'Id. para. 15.
1 Id. paras. 14, 23.aId. para. 16.
96 Id. para. 17.
17 Id. para. 17.
" Under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a vast majority of
the cases before the Court are requests by national courts for a Preliminary Ruling on an interpretation
of European Law, rather than a determination of the specific facts of the case. The interpretation,
however, as in the case of Google Spain, can determine the outcome of the national proceedings.
TFEU, supra note 50, art. 267, at 164.
* Google Spain, Case C-131/12, at para. 20(2)(b).
'm See Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(2), 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, 40 ("It shall be for the controller to




quickly found that "the operation of loading personal data on an Internet page must
be considered to be such 'processing'"o2 within the meaning of the Directive: 03
"[I]t must be found that, in exploring the internet automatically, constantly and
systematically in search of the information which is published there, the operator
of a search engine 'collects' such data which it subsequently 'retrieves,' 'records'
and 'organises' within the framework of its indexing programmes, 'stores' on its
servers and, as the case may be, 'discloses' and 'makes available' to its users in the
form of lists of search results. As those operations are referred to expressly and
unconditionally in Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46, they must be classified as
'processing' within the meaning of that provision, regardless of the fact that the
operator of the search engine also carries out the same operations in respect of
other types of information and does not distinguish between the latter and the
personal data.""
The Court went on to find that search engines have a significant effect on
fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data.'0o As actors
independent of the original publisher of the material, search engines determine
what material will be available to the Internet-using public.'o6 This is especially true
in light of current technology, which enables operators of search engines to exclude
certain materials from search results at the request of publishers.'
Ultimately, the Court held that the "right to be forgotten" is not absolute.'0 o
Instead, it requires a balancing between the interest of privacy and the significance
of the information at issue.o' This balancing potentially pits the right to privacy
against the freedom of expression and/or the right to receive information. Where
the controller determines that the interest of privacy does not rise to a level
requiring the link to the information to be severed, the Court held that either the
data protection authority, or a court, would be best suited to determine the
appropriate balance."10
Interestingly, the Court held that it is not just inaccurate information that
might be forgotten."' True and accurate material, which may be "inadequate,
102 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, at para. 26.
"'o The DPD defines "controller" in Article 2 as "the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be
designated by national or Community law." Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38.
The DPD also defines "processing" as "any operation or set of operations which is performed upon
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction." Id.
"' Google Spain, Case C-131/12, para. 28.
"0 Id. para. 38.
10 Id. paras. 38-39.
1o7 Id. paras. 39-40.
s Id. paras. 73-74.
o'Id. paras. 74-76.
no Id. para. 77.
n. Id. paras. 72, 92.
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irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing, that they are
not kept up to date, or that they are kept for longer than is necessary unless they are
required to be kept for historical, statistical or scientific purposes," are also subject
to the ruling."'
In its final analysis, the Court rejected the argument that a search engine is a
mere conduit of information and therefore not subject to the rules governing data
processing and the control of content."' The Court held that links are critical to
the analysis because the links that a search engine regulates control the information
that an end user receives.11 4 Therefore, the Court found that Google was subject to
European (and therefore Spanish) data protection rules."s As such, the right to
impart such information as protected by Article 10 ECHR, must be balanced
against the subject's right to private life and data protection as afforded by Article 8
ECHR and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. As material not of particular historical
or scientific import ages, its Article 10 value diminishes while its potential for
damage in light of Article 7 (privacy) may grow. Post- Google Spain, search engines
are now required to balance these various interests against each other."'
The Google Spain decision will undoubtedly influence the legislation machine
currently crafting the revision of the Data Protection Directive. Despite the
modern nature of the DPD at the time of its adoption, almost 20 years have since
passed, rendering it ill-suited to meet the needs and challenges of modern data
processing. The wish to delete data about oneself online is no longer seen as an
action borne out of a fear of governmental surveillance, but rather, an option that
many consider to be vital for a healthy reputation and successful professional life.
Furthermore, the great derogations in data protection laws of Member States
called for an update of the rules.1 Despite its adoption in 1995, many States took
six or seven years to announce their implementation measures, meaning that
technological advances during these years provided a large obstacle to
harmonization."s Additionally, as the DPD was not a maximum harmonization
measure, but permitted Member States with pre-existing data protection laws with
more extensive protection to subsist, the European Union has ended up with a
fragmented data protection landscape." 9 The Commission found that this legal
fragmentation of the European Union data protection framework hampered the
outcome of the "internal market objective."' 20 Having been adopted to benefit and
112 Id.
"13 Id. para. 100.
114 Id. paras. 35-38.
115 Id. para. 100.
11. Id. paras. 69, 71, 81.
117 See Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World: A European Data Protection Framework for
the 21st Century, at 2-3, 7, COM (2012) 9 final (Jan. 25,2012).
us See First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), at 3, 7,
10, COM (2003) 265 final (May 15, 2003).
19 See Private Data, Publc Rules, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/
21543489.
no Impact Assessment Accompanying Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
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promote the internal market, the DPD could thus not live up to its full economic
potential.'21
In 2012, the Commission adopted a proposal for reforming the data protection
regime of the European Union entitled the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) that aims to incorporate the "right to be forgotten" and "the right to
erasure."122 The proposal attempts to empower data subjects by giving them the
right to request that their personal data is fully removed when it is no longer
needed for the purposes for which it was collected, therefore, enabling them to
obtain a clean slate.123
One stated goal of the GDPR is protecting privacy retroactively. The proposal
includes a specific reference to data made public while the data subject was a child.
This is intended to highlight the importance of retrospective privacy-in the sense
that people who become privacy-aware later in life should not be left without
protection.124
Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) and Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or
Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and the Free Movement of
such Data, at 11, SEC (2012) 72 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
121 The nature of a Directive allows for a certain margin of discretion between Member States in
their implementation of European Law. Monitoring Implementation of EU Directives, EUR.
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/implementation-monitoring/indexen.htm
(last updated Feb. 8, 2015). Conversely, a Regulation has horizontal direct effect and applies in the same
manner to each Member States as written.
122 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data
(General Data Protection Regulation), at 25, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter GDPR
2012].
123 See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 ('"[Plrocessing of personal data'
('processing') shall mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction."); see also Viviane Reding, Vice-
President of the European Comm'n Responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship,
Speech at the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU: Building Trust in Europe's Online Single
Market (une 22, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference-SPEECH
/10/327.
" "This right is particularly relevant, when the data subject has given their consent as a child, when
not being filly aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later wants to remove such personal
data especially on the Internet." GDPR 2012, supra note 122, at 25. The European Parliament's
amended draft does not contain the reference to the right applying "specifically to [when the data
subject was] a child." See Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection ofIndividuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation),
COM (2012) (Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter GDPR 2014], available athttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/si
des/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0212+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN. Such a
removal brings a more linear right, as it effectively applies to all data subjects wishing to delete data
about themselves and not only those who published data when they were children. Still, as will be shown
below, the very inclusion of this wording indicates that, at the heart of the matter, the E.U. and U.S.
approaches are more similar than they appear at first glance.
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The amended draft of the GDPR was approved by the European Parliament
following the vote in plenary on March 12, 2014.125 The amended text does away
with the highly controversial "right to be forgotten" label and replaces it with "the
right to erasure."' 26 While the name change may serve to lessen its contentious
nature by aligning it with the current wording of the Data Protection Directive, a
close reading of the amended text shows that the main elements of "the right to be
forgotten" remain.
The European Council is still debating the text and it is not clear what the final
text after deliberation will look like. According to Article 17(1) of the proposed
Regulation:
The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of
personal data relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of
such data . . . where one of the following grounds applies:
(a) the data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they
were collected or otherwise processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based
according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or when the storage period consented
to has expired, and where there is no other legal ground for the processing
of the data;
(c) the data subject objects to the processing of personal data pursuant to
Article 19;
(d) the processing of the data does not comply with this Regulation for other
reasons.12s
If the proposed amendments are adopted, the GDPR would retain the same
exceptions as the DPD, including: areas falling outside the scope of Union law,
such as national security,1 29 information relating to the prevention, investigation,
detection, or prosecution of criminal offences,' and the household exemption. 131
The GDPR would also explicitly set out that the "Regulation shall be without
prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the liability
rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive. "132
What Article 17 does offer is a clearer right to have data deleted. There is no
longer a requirement for the data to be inaccurate or not in line with the legal
12s GDPR 2014, supra note 122. It should, however, be noted that the majority of legislation
following the co-decision procedure leaned towards the opinion of the Council.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. art. 17(1), at 51.
129 Id. art. 2(2)(a), at 40.
0 Id. art. 2(2)(e), at 40.
131 Id. art. 2(2)(d), at 40. This article has been amended to include language stating that the activity
of the person must be "without any gainful interest in the course of its own exclusively personal or
household activity." Id.
132 Id. art. 2(3), at 41.
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framework; the GDPR outlines that data must be deleted upon withdrawal of
consent.133 This alleviates the uncertainty of the DPD. Additionally, there is the
novel requirement that the data should be deleted if the agreed time period for
storage has expired. Such a time period might be achieved through the application
of specific meta-data, which catalogues expiration values of data or through another
form of technical solution.134 The Regulation here relies heavily on technical
privacy-by-design measures, which would allow controllers to attach a time frame
(or expiration date) to data.
Finally, Article 17 includes an obligation for data controllers, who are
responsible for the publication of data, to take all reasonable steps, including
technical measures, "to inform third parties . . . that a data subject requests [erasure
of personal data].""'s Additionally, where there had been publication by a third
party and "[w]here the controller has authorised a third party publication of
personal data, the controller shall be considered responsible for that publication."3 6
Ultimately, the right to be forgotten in Europe has a fundamental basis in
primary law. This right is rooted in the enumerated protection of privacy found in
both the ECHR and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The CJEU
has further protected data subjects by finding that search engines, such as Google,
have a legal obligation to sever links to material which no longer serves a
fundamental purpose and for which the subject objects. And the European Union
has implemented (and will soon implement) further processes to enable data
subjects to exercise this right.
II. THE AMERICAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The right to privacy (and by extension, the "right to be forgotten") in the
United States is a far more opaque right. It is un-enumerated and more
controversial. Yet, there is a basis for such a right, although more tenuous and more
difficult to find.
A. Basis for the Right: American Privacy
One might get the impression from discussions surrounding the CJEU's
Google Spain decision that the Europeans are alone in their quest to be forgotten.
However, there is an emerging right to be forgotten in the United States as well. A
major restraint on its development has been the free speech protections found in
the First Amendment. The following section will briefly examine where the right
to privacy comes from in the United States. From there, the tension between
133 Id. art. 2, at 40-41.
134 Steven C. Bennett, The "Right To Be Forgotten"- Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30
BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 161, 180-181 (2012).
"s GDPR 2012, supra note 122, art. 17, at 51.
136 Id.
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personality rights and free speech will be explored. Finally, efforts underway in the
U.S. to secure a right to be forgotten will be examined.
The legal basis for regulation in the United States is much more elusive when
compared to the legal basis in the European context. While the rights of the
Convention are equal, and should be balanced against each other, the competing
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are not as easily balanced. The competing
rights at stake when one speaks about the "right to be forgotten" are the non-
enumerated right to privacy and the right of free expression protected by the First
Amendment. Privacy is never expressly mentioned in the text of the U.S.
Constitution or Bill of Rights; instead, it is often seen as a thread that continues
throughout the entire document... It is fundamentally a right against governmental
intrusion, rather than private intrusion. 38 Its fingerprints can be seen in the First
Amendment's protection of religion or conscience, as a protection against
governmental intrusion into how one might choose to worship.'3 9 Similarly, it is
reflected in the right of association, the prohibition against quartering soldiers and
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.'40 The idea of the right to
privacy in the American context was first expressed in 1890 by the noted professors
Warren and Brandies in their article The Right to Privacy, and it more closely
resembles a right to be left alone rather than a right to privacy in the European
sense. 1 41
The constitutional jurisprudence regarding the development of constitutional
privacy right, including Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 142 Eisenstadt v. Baird
(1972),'14 Roe v. Wade (1972)," and Lawrence v. Texas (2003),14' all focus on the
state's intrusion into the applicant's private decision-making process. Private or
corporate action has not fallen under constitutional prohibition, rather private
actions are addressed under a common law tort of invasion ofprivacy.146 This cause
of action protects individuals against nongovernmental intrusion of their privacy.1 47
The problem with assertion of this right is that it is disparate amongst the states of
the United States.1 48 Many states do not recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. 49
137 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (discussing several of the proverbial
penumbras in the constitution where privacy is protected).
138 See id. at 483-84 (stating that the right to privacy protections in the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments are from governmental intrusion); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(stating generally that the right to privacy is "the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion").
139 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
" See id. at 483-84.
14 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195-96
(1890).
142 381 U.S. at 480, 485-86.
143 405 U.S. at 440-41, 453.
144 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
145 539 U.S. 558,577-79 (2003).
14 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 141, at 211, 218-19.
147 Id.
148 See MARY MCTHOMAS, THE DUAL SYSTEM OF PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
21 (Robert M. Howard ed., 2013).
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Scholars such as William Prosser, Anita Allen, and Mary McThomas have
struggled to identify the basis for privacy protection in the American system.
McThomas, synthesising theorists before her, has identified two strains that are
relevant to a discussion of the "right to be forgotten."'s The first is decisional
privacy, and the second being proprietary privacy. ' Decisional privacy
encompasses grand rights of self-determination and liberty, some of which include
the right to marry in all of its forms, reproductive freedom, and other autonomy-
based rights.'52 Proprietary privacy rights are those that concern ones image, both
in a real sense (e.g., photographs, etc.) and a less concrete way, such as
reputation.15 These rights, rather than being based upon autonomy or liberty
theories, are rooted in a protection ofproperty rights analysis.'54 McThomas asserts
that courts (and legislatures) are more likely to protect proprietary privacy rights as
opposed to decisional rights, perhaps because they are in some way more tangible
and are perceived as much more singular.' A decision on whether same-sex
marriage should be allowed for one set of litigants has great societal impact,
whereas the award of damages for the violation of a duty to protect private data
may not seem to have similar import.
Since proprietary privacy rights are rooted in a concept of ownership, a key issue
regarding the "right to be forgotten" in the United States centers around ownership
of the information in question. Whereas there is a great acceptance in Europe that
one's reputation belongs to oneself, this concept is not as widely accepted in the
United States."s6 If the data in question belongs to the individual, rather than the
Internet platform, there is a greater likelihood that courts would be willing to
enforce the individual's right to control this data.s7
The counter-posed right is that of the freedom of the press: "Congress shall
make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."1 5
While today this right is viewed by many as fundamental to the very fabric of
American democracy, it was not litigated to any measure until after the First World
War.s' Slowly, the U.S. Supreme Court began to protect more and more facets of
speech, but most important of all was the freedom of political speech and the
freedom of the press.160 Competing with this right-particularly coming out of the
common law system-was tort, and sometimes the crime of defamation, in which
149 See id.
150 Id. at 2-4.
15 Id.
152 Id. at 3.
153 Id. at 3-5.
154 Id.
1ss Id. at 5-7.
156 See id. at 23.
1' See id.
iss U.S. CONST. amend. I.
`s See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299 & n.3 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
16 See id. at 270-71 (Brennen, J.).
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litigants were given a cause of action for injury to reputation at the hands of an
individual or newspaper."'
In 1964, the Supreme Court greatly changed the playing field by
constitutionalizing the analysis of defamation, specifically the law of libel or written
defamation. 162 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court held that in
defamation cases involving public officials, the plaintiff must prove that not only
was the statement false, but also that the publisher acted with actual malice,
indicating that the publisher either intended to publish the false statement, or that
she acted with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. At its core
was a prioritization of speech and public debate over privacy and reputation.1 3
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court extended the analysis to private
individuals, finding that the defamation analysis differs in the context of non-
public figures.' 64 In this case, the Court held that a defamation claim does not
require proof only of actual malice.' If the false published statement is merely
recklessly collected or disseminated, the cause of action for defamation will be
sustained."'
The shared principle between New York Times and Curtis Publishing,
however, is that truth trumps privacy. If the statement is true, no matter how
damaging, no matter if the subject is a public or private person, the claim cannot
succeed.
B. American Efforts to be Forgotten
Given the emphasis on priority of speech over privacy, the idea of a "right to be
forgotten" may seem very foreign to the American culture. It is not that there is a
particular right to remember-yet the role of the press is just that. What has
changed are the tools by which the press (and thereby the public) are able to
remember. This poses no problem when specifically dealing with public officials.
While the European context does not specifically differentiate between public and
private individuals in defamation law, the courts often look at the value of the
information to the public discourse.'16 Presumably, some information, particularly
when it comes to issues of public concern, is relevant long after its collection or
publication, regardless of its damage to reputation. More difficult are the cases
involving the collection, use, and potential publication of data that are of very
limited worth to a grander public discussion. In these cases, the American system
might be willing to venture into the waters of greater privacy protection,
particularly because of the limited impact upon the freedom of expression.
' See id. at 301-02 & n.4 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
162 See id. at 301-02.
163 Id. at 279-80 (Brennen, J.).
1" Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967).
16s Id. at 164-165.
166 Id.
167 See generally Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
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With respect to data of individuals that is collected by Internet services, rather
than public information reported in the press, the regulation of that data and the
individual's control over it is not very clear. Rather than an overarching legal
strategy, legislation has focused on certain isolated realms of data. For instance, the
privacy of health care data is protected by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which requires that holders of private health care
information not disclose information to third parties without the authorization of
the data subject."'s There are also provisions that guard against disclosure of
financial information without authorization in specific cases. However, these
mechanisms are geared more towards preventing discrimination against the data
subject rather than protecting a sacred right. There does seem, however, to be an
Internet privacy movement beginning in the U.S. In the wake of the National
Security Agency (NSA) surveillance disclosures, the American think tank, The
Pew Foundation found that American Internet users are changing their browsing
habits.' 9 A report issued in September of 2013 found that 86% of users had taken
steps to mask their identity while surfing the web. "' Furthermore, 41% had
attempted to delete or edit past posts, while 55% had taken steps to avoid
surveillance by certain people, organizations or governmental entities. 171
Interestingly, 68% of users believed that laws to protect online privacy in the
United States were inadequate.1 72 This and similar sentiments may be behind
modest efforts in the U.S. to provide some form of protection for the most
vulnerable Internet users.
Two legislative efforts currently underway in the United States exemplify the
American perspective on data protection privacy. The first is California Senate Bill
568, a measure that went into force on January 1, 2015.173 The second is a
proposed federal legislation entitled Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013, which is
currently making its way through the Congress.174 Both the California law and the
Federal proposal can be seen as preliminary steps in limiting the availability of
information. This limitation may have social value on a macro scale; however, it
might also have great consequences on individuals. Both measures are also part of a
greater effort to protect children in a cyber environment.
16. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1177,
10 Stat. 1936, 2029.
169 See LEE RAINIE ET. AL, PEw RESEARCH CENTER, ANoNYMITY, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY





173 S. 568, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
174 Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013, S. 1700, 113th Cong. (2013). Previous legislative attempts had
been undertaken in 2011 with the Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011. See Press Release, Ed Markey, U.S.
Senator for Mass., May 13, 2011: Markey, Barton Introduce Bipartisan 'Do Not Track Kids Act' (May
13, 2011), available at http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/may-13-2011-markey-
barton-introduce-bipartisan-do-not-track-kids-act.
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1. California Senate Bill 568's Limited Right to be Forgotten.-In September
2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law a measure amending the
California Business and Professions Code, relating to the internet. 17s The
amendment, California Senate Bill 568 ("The Act"), seeks to give some users of
social media a right to erasure.1 76 The Act, which went into effect in January of
2015, is limited in scope and in application. It has been derided as an
unconstitutional intrusion on the right of free speech, and as a mechanism that is
too narrow to actually protect its stated interests. 7 7
The adopted Act is remarkably simple in its approach and limited in its
application. It does not protect a general "right to be forgotten" as it only protects
minors from materials which they have posted online themselves.17' Additionally,
the legislation's aims are coupled with other concerns regarding the use of the
internet by vulnerable youths. The legislation requires that providers of web sites,
online services, Internet applications, and mobile applications refrain from
marketing or advertising specific types of products or services to minors.179 The Act
also prohibits these providers from knowingly using, disclosing, or compiling
minor's personal information for purposes of advertising or marketing said products
or services.so
Additionally, The Act requires operators to allow minors to remove content or
information posted on the operator's website by the minor.' The law does not
compel the operator to remove material if it is posted by a third person, if the
operator is required to keep the information pursuant to federal or state law, or if
the operator anonymizes the information.' 82 Lastly, the operator is required to
notify the users of their rights to removal pursuant to The Act."'
In enacting California Senate Bill 568, the legislature recognized that the
balance between the rights of Internet users to privacy and the right to freedom of
expression were out of sync in terms of social media used by young people.
Especially given the prevalent usage of social media by minors, as well as the lack of
1s Brett Lockwood & Katharine F. Rowe, Client Alerts: New California Law Extends Additional
Protection to Minors on the Internet, SMITH, GAMBRELL, & RUSSELL, LLP (May 4, 2014),
http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/client-alerts/new-california-law-extends-additional-protections-to-
minors-on-the-internet.
76 Cal. S. 568.
117 See Eric Goldman, California's Latest Effort to 'Protect Kids Online' Is Misguided
and Unconstitutional, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman
/2013/09/30/californias-latest-effort-to-protect-kids-online-is-misguided-and-unconstitutional/.
17 See generally id. (discussing the privacy interests of minors on the internet).
17 Id. § 22580(i). This section identifies the products prohibited from online advertising or
marketing to minors: alcoholic beverages, firearms, BB guns, handgun safety certificates, spray paint,
etching cream that is capable of defacing property, tobacco products and paraphernalia, dangerous
fireworks, tanning in an ultraviolet tanning devices, dietary supplements products containing ephedrine,
lottery games, or products containing Salvia divinorum (a psycho-active plant). Id.
iso Id. § 22580(c).
1s' Id. § 22581(a)(1).
182 Id. § 22581(a)(2).
15 Id. § 22581(b).
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understanding of the effects of posting sensitive information on the internet, the
legislature saw a need to protect children from themselves.
The effectiveness of the measure's erasure mechanism is questionable. It is
limited in scope given that the wording of the provision only seems to cover
individuals who post material and request its removal before they turn eighteen.
While this provision might be interpreted as more expansive, allowing for the
removal of posts made by individuals younger than eighteen by individuals over
eighteen, this reading would seem to run contrary to the measure's plain wording.
As far as the economic impact of the measure, there has been a deafening silence.
Perhaps because of the duplicative nature of the measure, there has not been an
outrage regarding this aspect of the legislation. There have, however, been grave
doubts as to the constitutionality of the erasure requirement.1 84
A further complication occurs when a data subject wishes to delete personal
information that has been provided by a third party. Many social networking sites,
for example, retain the power to remove information that is deemed to be offensive
or defamatory,1 5 however, these sites often argue that issues relating to data posted
by one user and not wanted by the other need to be sorted out personally between
the two users.8 6 This general policy leaves open the question: What happens when
a picture is posted by an unknown person of the data subject or posted by a person
with actual intent to cause damage to the data subject?
The Act implemented in California is quite clear in this situation. Only
information submitted by the data subject can be removed and information posted
by another individual is strictly off-limits-at least, if relying on these provisions.'8
This issue is especially relevant in light of a recent Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision where the court held that there is First Amendment protection
for "liked" material on Facebook, holding that "liking" something constitutes
expression, which is protected.' This holding begs the question of whether
deletion of material that has been "liked" then violates the "liker's" free speech
interests. Furthermore, what if a third party user makes a comment on a post that
might later be erased pursuant to the new law? When a social network devises its
1"4 See, e.g., Thomas R. Burke et al., California's "Onlne Eraser" Law for Minors to Take Effect
Jan. 1, 2015, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.dwt.com/Californias-
Online-Eraser-Law-for-Minors-to-Take-Effect-Jan-1-2015-11-17-2014/.
185 See, e.g., Statement ofRights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms (last updated Nov. 15, 2013) (stating that Facebook retains the right to "remove any content
or information . . . post[ed] on Facebook if [it] believe[s] that it violates [the] Statement or [its]
policies").
18 See, e.g., Larry Magid, Facebook Builds Reporting Tools to Encourage 'Compassion,'
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2012, 7:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-magid/facebook-
builds-reporting-b_1686464.html (noting that Facebook is "experimenting with 'social reporting'
designed to encourage users to work out issues between themselves . . .").
1 See Cal. S. 568 § 22581. Admittedly, this is done in an attempt to ensure that the right to
freedom of expression is not infringed upon.
"s See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Joe Palazzolo, Court:
Facebook 'Like' Is Protected By the First Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2013, 9:55AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/09/18/court-facebook-like-is-protected-by-the-first-amendment.
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own policies that outline erasure, there is no governmental interference with the
freedom of speech right, which might trigger the application of the First
Amendment. However, when the erasure is mandated by statute, the state action is
more apparent.
2. Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013.-Fitting hand-in-glove with the California
legislation is a federal effort to extend the California protection to the rest of the
United States. In 2011, then Representative Edward Markey proposed
amendments to the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 to extend a
"right to be forgotten" to children."s' While this bill was never adopted, Edward
Markey-this time a senator-proposed a similar bill in 2013. 190 The new
amendments contained in the Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013 require use of a
delete button, whereby children have the ability to delete material hastily posted."'
Representative Markey saw this right as one that should be extended to all online
users, but argued that the protection of children was a good starting point.9 2
Similar to the California measure, the Do Not Track Kids Act requires websites to
inform users of what information is being collected and for what purpose."' The
law requires that websites obtain permission from the parents of minor users before
data is collected. 19 The legislation also prohibits the use of the material for
marketing purposes.19 Lastly, the law requires the erasure button described
above.' 6 Once prompted, the extent of the duty to erase material is simply to make
the material unavailable to third parties.
The original Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (the precursor to the Do
Not Track Kids Act) came into force in 1998 and prohibited the collection of
"personal information" of children under thirteen years of age without the
"verifiable consent" of a parent. 1' The Act empowered the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to promulgate regulations to implement these protections.1 9 8
In 2000, the FTC promulgated the original rule, which defined "personal
information" as little more than the name, address, telephone number, social
security number, and birthdate of the child.' 99 Due to changes in technology, the
FTC broadened the scope of the definition of "personal information" in 2013 to
19 Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 to apply the prohibitions against collecting personal information
from children to online applications and mobile applications directed to children).
1" Christin S. McMeley, Paul Glist & Leslie Gallagher Moylan, Federal Lawmakers Revive Do
Not Track Kids Legislation, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/
Federal-Lawmakers-Revive-Do-Not-Track-Kids-Legislation.
191 See Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013, S. 1700, 113th Cong. § 7(b)(1)(A) (2013).
192 Ambrose & Ausloos, supra note 65, at 14.
193 See S. 1700 § 3.
194 See id.
195 See S. 1700 § 4.
" See id. § 7(b)(1)(A).
197 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6502(a),(b) (2012).
198 Id. § 6505.
1" 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2000) (defining personal information).
2ol4-2ol5] 335
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
include user names and geo-locations-which identify a child's location,
photographs, and voice files. 200
The proposed amendments also expand coverage of the Do Not Track Kids Act
to minors between thirteen years old and fifteen years old, potentially significantly
altering compliance requirements for companies such as Facebook, which only
accepts clients older than thirteen years old. 20 1
What these measures reflect is a priority to protect the personality interests of
the most vulnerable. Whereas Senator Markey sees future action to extend the
protections to adult Internet users, the realization of this goal seems far off into the
future, if feasible at all. The non-profit, government transparency watchdog group,
GovTrack, which monitors proposed Congressional legislation, gives the measure
only a two percent chance of being enacted in the current session, despite bipartisan
support in both houses of Congress. 202 Notwithstanding this prognosis, legislatures
are more willing to sponsor measures that protect against the dangers of the
Internet's memory, representing a possible shift in the debate. 20' Because these
protective measures are extremely far-reaching, not only they can surely assuage
concerns regarding the privacy of minors, but they can protect against certain
Internet abuses as well.
3. Revenge Porn.-One area where the "right to be forgotten" would prove
fortuitous is for revenge porn sites. Revenge porn sites post intimate, unauthorized
photos of celebrities, jilted lovers, and those wishing to embarrass or harass sexual
partners. 204 Revenge porn can have devastating effects on its victims, and there is a
certain justice at stake that might not be as evident as with the right of eraser.
Often the images are not only unauthorized, but are also obtained illegally by
hacking. In the European Union, especially in light of the Google Spain decision,
victims are able to have the images suppressed by cutting the link to them within
searches. 205 Conversely, the United States has struggled with how to protect those
who are directly affected. The infamous U.S. example of Hunter Moore, proud
20 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2014) (redefining personal information to reflect technological changes).
201 Id.; see also Emam Llans6, Do Not Track Kids Bill Revives Minors' Online Privacy Debate,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &TECH. (Nov. 26, 2013), https://cdt.org/blog/do-not-track-kids-bill-revives-
minors'-online-privacy-debate/; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/1egal/terms (last updated Nov. 15, 2013) ("You will not use Facebook if you
are under 13.").
202 S. 1700 (113th): Do Not Track Kids Act of2013, GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us.
congress/bills/113/s1700 (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
203 See Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, NY TIMES (Oct. 30,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-on-privacy-
law.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
204 See Ave Mince-Didier, Revenge Porn: Laws & Penalties, CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYER,
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/revenge-porn-laws-penalties.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2015).
205 See Lilian Edwards, Revenge Porn: Why the Right To Be Forgotten Is the Right Remedy, THE
GUARDIAN (July 29, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/29/revenge-
porn-right-to-be-forgotten-house-of-lords.
336 [Vol. Io3
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
former proprietor of a revenge porn blog,206 illustrates this point. Through his site
entitled "Is Anyone Up?," Moore hosted a platform where users could post such
intimate pictures. 207 On his site, Moore encouraged the posts and benefited from
advertising revenue generated from the images. 208
Moore relied on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for
protection from liability for the content of his website, arguing that he was acting
merely as a hosting provider, and that the data controllers would be the individuals
actually uploading the pictures and information within them, and thus the parties
responsible in terms of liability.2 09 Yet, if Moore were in the European Union, the
analysis would be somewhat different. Because Moore gained commercial benefit
from the website, exercised editorial control over it, and organized the content, he
might rise to the level of "controller" and would thus fall within the scope of the
GDPR. 210
As public pressure mounted and the FBI began an investigation of Moore for
paying hackers to obtain photos that appeared on his site, Moore sold his enterprise
to an anti-bullying site named bullyville.com.2" In January of 2014, Moore and a
co-defendant Charles "Gary" Evens, were charged with fifteen counts of violations
of unauthorized access to a protected computer (also known as hacking),
aggravated identity theft, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting.2 12 The trial in these
matters has been postponed until 2015.213
206 See Jessica Roy, Revenge Porn ing Hunter Moore Was Arrested, But Not for Hosting
Revenge Porn, TIME (Jan. 27, 2014), http://newsfeed.time.com/2014/01/27/revenge-porn-king-
hunter-moore-was-arrested-but-not-for-hosting-revenge-pom.
207 See Emily Greenhouse, The Downfall of the Most Hated Man on the Internet, THE NEW
YORKER (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-downfall-of-the-most-hated-
man-on-the-internet.
208 See id.
2" See Roy, supra note 206. But see Delfi AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 64569/09 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-126635. In this European Court of Human
Rights case, a news outlet was held responsible for anonymous defamatory comments submitted to the
news outlet's website. See id. para. 94, at 32. The national court held the news outlet responsible for the
comments with the latter appealing to the ECHR arguing that their Article 10 right to freedom of
expression had been infringed and that, subject to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, they could
not be held liable. See id. paras. 46, 52, 53 at 18-20. The ECHR stated that there was no infringement
because the news outlet should have anticipated the onslaught of comments and reacted accordingly. See
id. para. 86, at 29. Furthermore, as the commenters were anonymous and would be highly difficult to
find, holding the news outlet liable was reasonable, especially as it drew commercial benefit from the
comments. See id. para. 94, at 32.
210 GDPR 2012, supra note 122, art. 4, at 41 (defining "controller" as the "natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes,
conditions and means of the processing of personal data").
211 See Camille Dodero, "Gary Jones" Wants Your Nudes, THE VILLAGE VOICE, (May 16, 2012),
http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-05-16/news/hacker-is-anyone-up-hunter-moore-fbi/.
212 See Indictment, United States v. Moore, No. 13-0917 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013), available at
http://ia600507.us.archive.org/4/items/gov.uscourts.cacd.579295/gov.uscourts.cacd.579295.1.0.pdf
(listing the charges against the defendants for violation of unauthorized access to a protected computer,
aggravated identity theft, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting).
213 Order Continuing Trial Date and Findings Regarding Excludable Time Periods Pursuant to
Speedy Trial Act, United States v. Moore, No. 13-0917 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014).
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The Moore case follows the 2012 conviction of Christopher Chaney, a hacker
who posted photos of celebrities and non-celebrities alike.214 He received a sentence
of ten years in federal prison after pleading guilty to charges including wiretapping
and unauthorized access to a computer. 215 Chaney particularly targeted female
celebrities.216 Many of the photos he posted appear to still be available on different
sites on the internet. In both the Moore and Chaney cases, prosecutors targeted the
hacking rather than the image posting to obtain convictions. The deficiencies in
existing data protection law are shown by the fact that the images remain with no
effective remedy for removal.
Against this backdrop, several states have introduced measures that criminalize
the act of posting these private images with the intent to humiliate their subjects.
One such measure amends the Disorderly Conduct section of the California Penal
Code and holds liable:
Any person who photographs or records by any means the image of the intimate body
part or parts of another identifiable person, under circumstances where the parties
agree or understand that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious emotional distress, and
the depicted person suffers serious emotional distress.217
Additional efforts to eradicate revenge porn will perhaps prove more effective.
In December of 2013, California Department of Justice agents arrested a revenge
porn operator, Kevin Bollaert, for allegedly posting sexualized images of unwilling
subjects, on charges of conspiracy, identity theft, and extortion. 218 California's
Penal Code makes it illegal to "willfully obtain someone's personal identifying
information, including name, age and address, for any unlawful purpose, including
with the intent to annoy or harass."219 In violation of this statute, Bollaert, the
operator of ugotposted.com, posted more than 10,000 nude photos of unwilling
subjects. 2 2 0 However, Bollaert was not charged under the new California law, but
rather under identity theft and extortion provisions of federal law, as he identified
214 See Christopher Chaney, So-Called Hollywood Hacker, Gets 10 Years for Posting Celebrities'





217 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2014).
218 See Don Thompson, Court Date Set for Kevin Bollaert in Revenge Porn Website Case,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 1:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/kevin-
bollaert-revenge-porn.n_4432097.html.
219 Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, Att'y Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D.
Harris Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Website Operator (Dec. 10, 2013), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-arrest-revenge-
porn-website-operator; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 530.5, 653m(b) (West 2014).
' See Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, supra note 219.
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the victims and extorted them by offering to remove the images for a fee between
$250 and $350.221
Importantly, the provisions of California's new legislation do not require
removal of the material; rather, the poster of the material is liable for a
misdemeanor.222 Consequently, a user who posts a sexual "selfie," which he later
regrets, has no recourse for removing or forgetting the image. 223 However, the
provisions taken together seek to give vulnerable members of society control over
the way they are represented. Yet this protection, like the protection envisioned in
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, is limited in what
images can be erased. If third parties post these images and are justified in doing
so, the subject will not be successful in their attempt to have the material erased.
Yet if the images are of a sexual nature and were intended for personal and intimate
consumption, then the subject might have redress. 22 4
III. FORGETTING: AN EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE - OR, THE CRUMBLY ERASER?
The questions that are left after the exploration of what extent the "right to be
forgotten" exists in Europe and the United States are that of necessity and
implementation.
Acknowledging that in Europe, there exists a basis for the right in primary law,
and in the United States a much more limited, exception basis, an important
question that remains is whether the "right to be forgotten" is worth all the hype?
Given that "the right to be forgotten" arguably impinges upon the freedom of
expression, and could potentially cost search engines and other web-based
businesses millions, is it effective? 215
On the question of necessity, a further understanding of what remains on the
internet is essential. Legal scholar Meg Ambose asserts that ephemerality is a key
concept of the Internet. She posits that most information posted on the Internet is
subsumed by its vastness within a couple of months.226 Additionally, rather than an
organized library of information, the internet more closely resembles a warehouse
of poorly categorized material. Called by some the world's largest Xerox
221 See Thompson, supra note 218.
222 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(1) (West 2014).
223 Eric Goldman, California's New Law Shows It's Not Easy to Regulate Revenge Porn, FORBES
(Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californias-new-law-
shows-its-not-easy-to-regulate-revenge-porn/.
224 CAL. PENAL CODE, supra note 217.
m See Craig A. Newman, A Right To Be Forgotten' Will Cost Europe, WASH. POST (May 26,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-right-to-be-forgotten-will-cost-europe/2014/05/26
/93bbOe8c-el31-11e3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html (noting that the costs of the right to be
forgotten likely will be astronomically high, yet truly incalculable, due to the potential of millions of
deletion requests and removal demands).
226 Meg Leta Ambrose, It's About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the Right To Be
Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 369 (2013).
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machine, 227 the internet is made up of a series of images that are not readily
associated or categorized. Ambrose, among others, has argued that the perception
that information held on the internet is permanent is a misconception.228 She
asserts that Internet information is particularly susceptible to degradation, primarily
from technical conditions that require individual sites to be maintained as time
passes. 2 9 Additionally, as sites are preserved and updated, information that might
be the target of an asserted "right to be forgotten" is lost as individual pages are
changed. In her article on the ephemeral nature of such information, Ambrose cites
studies which found that ninety per cent of information was changed (and therefore
was lost) over a period of ten days.230 Yet these same studies indicate that it takes
nearly eight and a half years for the selected sample of URLs to change
completely.231 Additionally, as potentially embarrassing information ages, its "rank"
within the search engine index falls since its availability is directly tied to the
amount of hits it receives. Ironically, the information becomes less accessible (lower
on the rank of search results) the less searchers that click on the link, and less
searchers then click on the link as the material becomes less retrievable. This self-
eating snake scenario minimizes the need for a strict "right to be forgotten."
Information is more secure and durable in maintained archive systems, such as
those preserved online by newspapers. This was the circumstance in Google Spain,
where particular information held in a newspaper article was the subject of Mr.
Costeja-Gonzalez's complaint. 23 2 Interestingly, the CJEU did not find that the
material on the original new site ought to be removed, but rather Google had a
responsibility to cut the link between the search and the information. 233 The
archive is then left intact on the internet; however, retrieving the information is
more difficult.
A second and perhaps more worrying question concerns how the right to be
forgotten, particularly after the Google Spain decision, will be implemented? In
this regard, it is important to remember that since search engines are not publishers
of the original material, their free speech interests might be less than the original
author or publisher. As search engines attempt to limit their litigation costs,
including exposure to damages, which might be incurred under the new regulation,
227 Hamilton Nolan, The Internet Is the Biggest Threat to PubBshing Since the ... Xerox
Machine?, GAWKER (Mar. 13, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://gawker.com/5892819/the-internet-is-the-
biggest-threat-to-publishing-since-the-xerox-machine (quoting John R. "Rick" MacArthur, Harper's
Magazine Publisher) (stating that the internet is just a huge Xerox photocopier with an "inhuman
memory").
228 Id.; see also Paulan Korenhof et al., Timing the Right To Be Forgotten: A Study into "Time" as
a Factor in Deciding about Retention or Erasure of Data (May 13, 2014) (unpublished paper), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436436.
2 9Ambrose, supra note 226.
230 Id. at 392.
231 Id.
232 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL Google, Inc. v. Agencia Espaiola de Protecci6n de Datos
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some engines will prefer to err on the side of caution rather than risk fines for
keeping links to materials in the interest of the public. This seems to have already
occurred. According to several reports, European Google outlets have severed links
to past articles regarding poor decisions made by prominent business figures rather
than risk exposure resulting from litigation.23 4 Case and point, since the Google
Spain decision, Google has received thousands of forget requests235 and has severed
one BBC report and six articles which appeared in The Guardian regarding the
former CEO of Merrill Lynch."' The news items, which appeared in the mid
2000's, dealt with Stan O'Neal's departure from the ailing enterprise. It does not
appear that there were inaccuracies in the articles, but rather they carried the
potential to impact the former CEO's future job prospects. However, the collapse
of Merrill Lynch was closely linked to an economic crisis, and the stories would
qualify under an exemption for information valuable to the public interest. Yet, if a
search engine doesn't want to incur the costs of litigation against a well-heeled
opponent, it makes more business sense to simply honor the request to delete the
information. Neither the BBC nor The Guardian would have standing to challenge
Google - it would be Google's decision to make.237 When voluntarily severed, there
is no governmental oversight. The potential free speech implications in such cases
are significant, and ultimately the credibility of the search engine might be called
into question.238
When Google takes something down as a result of a "forget request," the
company notifies searchers with a tag at the bottom of the search request, which
states: "Some request may have been removed under data protection law in Europe.
Learn more." 239 While it may be that Google is acting with understandable caution,
it may also be trying to show the impact of the Google Spain ruling on the
availability of information after the ruling. Additionally, there is a question as to
whether the notice which is posted after a removal will become worse than the
material itself-searchers will be left to surmise what information was so horrible
that it warranted removal. Inevitably, these issues will need to be addressed in
2015, when the European Union begins to craft the new Regulation. Perhaps there
should be governmental (at least judicial) oversight of "forget requests" which
would ensure that basic principles, such as the freedom of expression and the
freedom to receive information are respected.
234 See Paul Bernal, Is Google Undermining the 'Right To Be Forgotten?, CNN (July 7, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/07/opinion/bernal-google-undermining-privacy-ruling/.
235 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion.
236 See Jim Edwards, Google Is Being Forced To Censor the History of Merrill Lynch - And
That Should Terrify You, BUS. INSIDER (July 3, 2014, 6:48 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
google-merrill-lynch-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten-2014-7.
237 Robert Peston, Why Has Google Cast Me into Oblvion?, BBC NEWS (July 2, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581.
" See Edwards, supra note 236; see also James Ball, EU's Right To Be Forgotten: Guardian
Articles Have Been Hidden by Google, THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google.
239 Edwards, supra note 236.
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In response to the Google Spain decision, legislative initiatives, and perhaps
consumer agitation, online providers have begun to take action to ameliorate the
feeling that individuals are not in control of their online profiles. The most notable
of these initiatives is the voluntary "erase" buttons and policies for erasure offered
by such websites as Facebook. In theory, these services offer users the opportunity
to delete information from their profiles, yet the question remains as to whether
this merely hides the information or truly deletes it. Assuming that the information
is simply not accessible, is this move sufficient to stave off calls for legislative
measures? Additionally, will this information still be available to companies for
purposes of marketing or to law enforcement and security officials for investigatory
purposes?
Other platforms, such as the one employed by the app "SnapChat," employ a
time limitation for the availability of information, whereby a message-in the case
of SnapChat a video message-is only available for a short period of time, after
which it disappears. These messages, however, can be captured on the recipient's
device and thereby preserved and possibly re-disseminated.24 The promise of this
fleeting nature of communication however is not so clear as SnapChat recently
settled a complaint with the United States Federal Trade Commission for
deceptive practices regarding the service's promised deletion.2 41 Yet, the idea or
desirability of this feature remains popular among users. Currently, Facebook is
also exploring a similar service.2 42 While this type of ephemerality may satisfy some
privacy advocates, law enforcement officials might find it particularly
troublesome-the inaccessibility of information might be the equivalent of
destruction of evidence in some cases where the platform is used for illicit purposes.
The measures mentioned above may have dual purposes. First, they may simply
be a response to market conditions whereby privacy has become an attractive
commodity. Alternatively, they may be an attempt to make legislative actions
irrelevant-why are governmental protective measures needed if the industry has
responded to protect consumers voluntarily? Or perhaps it is an attempt to repair
the damage that the NSA scandal had on the reputation of Internet platforms. In
light of recent revelations surrounding the NSA surveillance program that exposed
the Federal Government's collection of Internet information and the service
provider acquiescence to this collection, many technology firms are in the cyber hot
240 When the image is captured by a recipient, the sender receives a message to this effect. See
Privacy Policy, SNAPCHAT, https://www.snapchat.com/privacy (last updated Nov. 17, 2014) ("[U]sers
who see your messages can always save them, either by taking a screenshot or by using some other
image-capture technology.. . . If we're able to detect that a recipient took a screenshot of a message you
sent, we'll try to notify you.").
241 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of
Disappearing Messages Were False (May 8, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were.
242 See Alexis Kleinman, Facebook Is Testing Self-Destructing Posts, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept.10, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/10/facebook-self-destruct n_5798
320.html.
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seat. 243 As users have become increasingly suspicious of technology firms, big
providers have begun to seek ways to rebuild trust with their clients and the public
as a whole.2' To this end Microsoft and Google have sought to not only distance
themselves from the actions of the United States federal agencies, and any
acquiescence they may be guilty of, each have rolled out new privacy products since
Edward Snowden's revelations in the summer of 2013. Adoption of a limited "right
to be forgotten" might be a cost effective way of renewing trust with users and
customers.
CONCLUSION
Today's interconnected world makes my private business, very much everyone's
business. The internet never forgets, but maybe it should.
One of the major issues about the "right to be forgotten" is the fear that it could
result in a Dark Age of the internet, where information mysteriously disappears
and the past is deleted with a click of the mouse. Parties both in the United States
and in the European Union worry that such a right could be used for, or result in,
censorship. For example, the inability to maintain a successful public record for
historical purposes, or the ability of one data subject to control their information
infringing on the rights of another, such as the case of a data subject wanting to
delete the information posted by a third party. It is the classic story of a clash of
both principles and perspectives. An essential fundamental right to have access to
and the ability to impart information is thrown against the rights of privacy,
autonomy, and in some cases, dignity.
As the theoretical basis of privacy has grown up very differently in the United
States and Europe, it is of little surprise that the conceptualization of a "right to be
forgotten" also differs greatly. The conundrum was born in an era when time
healed all wounds and individuals with a checkered past could cross an ocean or a
prairie to start a new life. Individuals who are wrongly accused or the victim of
horrible circumstances, who have made horrible mistakes or just had bad luck, have
often sought refuge in a new town with a fresh start, but they have always run the
risk that an old familiar face would appear in town to expose them as the fraud they
are, or perhaps were. It is this tug of war between the value of memory and the
ability to start anew, that is the question. In legal terms this competition is reflected
243 Charles Arthur and Domonic Rushe, NSA Scandal: Microsoft and Twitter Join Calls to
Disclose Data Requests, THE GUARDIAN (12 June 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jun/12/microsoft-twitter-rivals-nsa-requests; see also Ryan Gallagher, NSA Leaks Suggest Microsoft
May Have Misled Public Over Skype Eavesdropping, SLATE (13 June 2013) http://www.slate.com/blog
s/future-tense/2013/06/13/nsa-surveillanceeaks-suggestmicrosoft_may-have-misled-public-on-sky
pe.html.
244 See Glenn Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, THE
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-
collaboration-user-data; see also Jack Clark, Microsoft: NSA Security Fallout 'Getting Worse' ... 'Not




between the interest of free speech and the derivative privacy right to be forgotten,
or now, "erased".
When one analyzes the "right to be forgotten" in Europe and the United States,
one might be struck by the disconnect in shared foundations. In some ways the two
continents are speaking languages without a means to translate. In Europe,
emerging from a century of intermittent war, the Council of Europe and later the
European Union developed protections for the most basic primary concern: the
right to family and private life. This protection has grown, despite American
influences since the end of World War II, rather than as a result of it. Privacy is
explicitly protected in the ECHR, the Charter and national constitutions. The
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, and more recently in the Luxembourg
Court has developed to raise the interest of data subjects over the interests of those
who might process and exploit private information. This right has slowly expanded
not only to the collection and use of information, but also the availability of this
information to the public as a whole. Other rights, most notably the right to impart
and receive information, included in the freedom of expression have been balanced
against this right to privacy, often times with a negative result for the freedom of
expression.
In the United States, to the contrary, the right to privacy has developed on a
different path. In a land where the freedom of expression has become increasingly
protected, privacy has developed in its shade. American privacy is protected under
two theories, one being based on unenumerated constitutional protections which
seek to guard against state intrusions on autonomy rights, while the other seeks to
guard against intrusion of privacy rights based upon property rights. This process in
many ways is still developing and the struggle remains in determining which
information is worth protecting under which theory.
What is needed is a Rosetta Stone of understanding. The days of isolated legal
systems that do not take into account alternative systems with disparate concepts of
human rights protections are over. The efficiency of communications systems, and
to some extent, international trade, require access to the whole story. Yet when one
speaks of user posted selfies, ancient misdeeds or malicious ex-lover posts, the
information loses some of its importance in a democratic society.
The next question that remains is just how the European Union will proceed on
the new regulation. The Google Spain case clarified the Court's position, that there
is a European "right to be forgotten." Will an emboldened European Union take
the Court's message and further expand the right, or will there be a move to limit
the potential scope of the right as the Regulation is finalized? Also, going forward,
how will search engines such as Google implement the decision? Will they stand as
a guardian of information that ought to be in the public sphere - that truly informs
debate, or will they seek the more cost effective, easier "delete before litigation"
path? Let's hope we do not forget what is important.
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